We study the taxation of couples when female wages do not re ‡ect their true productivity. We show that the expression for the marginal tax rates of the male spouses is the same as in a Mirrleesian world where wages re ‡ect true productivities. Marginal taxes for the female spouses are reduced because of a Pigouvian correction. Consequently, the wage discrimination pleads for a lower marginal tax on the female spouse. Furthermore, the distortion of a couples'tradeo¤ between male and female labor supply is the same as in a Mirrleesian world without a gender wage gap. It only depends on true productivities and not on wages. In other words, the tax system completely neutralizes the extra distortion introduced by the wedge between the female spouse's wage and her true productivity.
Introduction
While plain discrimination appears to be declining, gender inequalities in the labor market remain substantial. These di¤erences cannot be explained solely by gender di¤erences in schooling, experience and job characteristics; see Blau and Kahn (2017) .
Instead the main "suspect" to explain the persistence of the gender wage gap (GWG) is the so-called "child penalty", see for instance Kleven et al. (2018) . Women who have interrupted their career for full-or part-time child care, su¤er from a wage penalty which lingers for decades when then they start to care for their dependant parent and su¤er "the good daughter penalty". While part of this child penalty is explained by persistent part time work of more family friendly career choices, it also includes a discrimination Financial support from the Chaire "Marché des risques et creation de valeur " of the FdR/SCOR is gratefully acknowledged.
y Toulouse School of Economics, University of Toulouse Capitole, 21 allée de Brienne, 31015 Toulouse, France, helmuth.cremer@tse-fr.eu.
z University of Augsburg, Germany, kerstin.roeder@wiwi.uni-augsburg.de part in that it introduces a wedge between wages and true productivities. For instance, Waldfogel (1997) concludes, based on longitudinal data that "even after controlling for part-time employment, a negative e¤ect of children on women's pay remains."
There appears to be a large societal consensus that this GWG ought to be eradicated or, at least, mitigated. This probably requires some drastic and potentially costly reforms of labor market and child care policies. Anyway, the trends observed over the last decades show that, even in the best case scenarios the GWG will continue to be around for quite a while.
Since the "disease"requires a long cure and convalescence, it appears to be desirable to treat and alleviate its "symptoms" in the meantime. In this note, we study one possible approach to such a symptomatic treatment, namely the proper design of the tax system and, particularly, the tax treatment of couples.
To make this point in the simplest possible way, we consider a population of unitary couples where male wages re ‡ect their true productivity, while female spouses receive a wage which is a given (possibly couple speci…c) proportion of their true productivity. In other words, the wage di¤erential is exogenous and the factor of proportionality lumps together all the factors a¤ecting the GWG including plain discrimination and, most signi…cantly, the child penalty or at least the part of it which cannot be explained by part-time work or career choices.
Our model is otherwise similar to Cremer et al. (2012) in that we study the Mirrleesian optimal taxation of male and female incomes and, particularly, the way it a¤ects the spouses'relative labor supplies. These are already distorted because of the GWG, and we examine if it is possible and desirable to undo these distortions via the tax system.
Couples' income taxation has of course already been widely studied in the literature; see Cremer et al. (2016) for an overview of the most signi…cant contributions.
From a methodological perspective the innovative feature of this note is that it explicitly accounts for gender wage discrimination and distinguishes between wages and true productivities. This aspect has to our knowledge so far been neglected in the literature and our analysis represents a …rst step to address this omission.
Model
Consider a population consisting of N types of couples, indexed i = 1; :::; N . The proportion of type-i couples is i . Spouses are indexed by the subscript j = f; m.
A couple's type is determined by the vector (n i f ; n i m ; w i f ; w i m ), where n i j is spouse j's true productivity. Technologies are linear so that marginal and average products are identical and constant. Furthermore, w i j = i j n i j represents the wage rate that spouses receive for their`i j units of labor so that gross earnings are y i j = w i j`i j . We make the traditional assumption that gross earnings are observable while wages and labor supplies are not. Wages may or may not re ‡ect a spouse's real productivity. To capture in the most parsimonious way the GWG, we assume that i f i m = 1. When i f < 1 the female spouse receives a lower wage for any given level of productivity than the male spouse. We impose no restriction on the distribution of productivities, except that it is discrete. In particular, the number of types can be arbitrary large (but …nite) and spouses productivities may or may not be correlated.
The utility of couple i is given by U (x i ;`i m ;`i f ); where x i is the consumption of a numeraire (private) good. The utility function is such that @U i =@x i > 0 and @U i =@`i j < 0. To express utilities as functions of observable variables, de…ne:
Observe that:
(1)
Couple' s optimization
The couple faces an income tax schedule T (y i f ; y i m ) so that its disposable income available for consumption x i is:
The couple chooses its labor supplies, y i m ; y i f and consumption x i to maximize V i subject to the budget constraint (2). The …rst-order conditions (FOCs) associated with this problem can be written as:
where T i y j @T i =@y i j denotes the marginal tax rate faced by spouse j in couple i.
Optimal tax problem
We consider (constrained) Pareto e¢ cient allocations obtained by maximizing the following welfare function
where i is the weight attached to couple i. While each spouse's before tax income y i j is publicly observable, wages and labor supplies are not. The statistical distribution of types, on the other hand, is common knowledge. Under the considered information structure, the government's instrument consists of a possibly nonlinear income tax scheme T (y i f ; y i m ) which can be positive or negative. Feasible allocations must satisfy the following incentive constraints
That is any type-i couple must be prevented from mimicking any type-b couple. In addition, the resource constraint
must hold. Note that the resource constraint depends on true productivities of the spouses. To maintain the disconnection between households and …rms, which is traditional in optimal tax models, we assume that …rms' pro…ts are taxed at 100%; see Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) .
The government maximizes (4) subject to (5) and (6) . The Lagrangean can be written as:
where > 0 is the Lagrange multiplier of the resource constraint while ib 0 is the Lagrange (Kuhn-Tucker) multiplier associated with the self-selection constraint from a type-i to a type-b couple. 1 The FOCs with respect to x i and y i j are given by: 1 Since the incentive constraints are inequalities this is a Kuhn Tucker problem so that either the constraint is binding or the associated multiplier is equal to zero.
The FOCs along with the constraints determine the (constrained) Pareto e¢ cient allocation. These conditions and all our subsequent results are very general. They do not depend on the pattern of binding incentive constraints nor on the type of mating, and they are valid for all constrained Pareto-e¢ cient allocations. Appendix 4 shows that by combining the two FOCs, the marginal rate of substitution between gross income and consumption can be expressed as
Marginal tax rates
Combining equations (3) and (9) 
We de…ne (10) as the Pigouvian tax rate. Indeed, in a full information setting the GWG is formally equivalent to an (non-anonymous) externality. First-best Pareto e¢ ciency is needed for the male spouse, while a Pigouvian subsidy applies to all female workers for whom i j < 1. Returning to the asymmetric information case, equations (3) and (9) result in:
Let us de…ne the (traditional) Mirrleesian tax rate without gender wage gap, as T M i y j = 1 A i j . It describes the solution to the optimal tax problem when i j = 1, for all spouses in all couples (i = 1; : : : ; N and j = f; m). Using (10) expression (11) can be written as:
Let us …rst consider the top-couple, that is the couple (if any) whom nobody wants to mimic implying bi = 0 8 b 6 = i. 2 For spouse j = f; m within this couple, we have
For the male spouse the traditional "no distortion at the top"result emerges, while for the female spouse we get a marginal Pigouvian subsidy if i f < 1. For all other couples the expressions for the marginal tax rate include a Mirrleesian (incentive) term and a Pigouvian term. Observe that while the Pigouvian term is exactly at its …rst-best level, the Mirrleesian analogy applies only to the rule. 3 The fact that the Mirrleesian tax rate is divided by i j may at …rst come as a surprise, but it has a simple explanation. The Mirrleesian rate applies by de…nition to y i j = w i j`i j . However, since the Pigouvian correction is also applied, the "true" income of spouse j is n i j`i j = w i j`i j = i j . The incentive part of the optimal tax rule then simply says that the Mirrleesian rate is applied to the "true" income of the spouse (as measured by their marginal product multiplied by labor supply).
When the assumption i f i m = 1 is imposed we then have
The marginal tax rate of the female spouse is always smaller than the Mirrleesian rate. In the traditional case where the Mirrleesian rate is positive, there is then a con ‡ict between incentive and Pigouvian considerations. If the wage gap is large it may outweigh the traditional tax argument and imply a negative marginal tax rate for the female spouse. 4 Another way to look at these results is to examine how female discrimination ( i f i m = 1) a¤ects the spouses' relative marginal tax rates. The conventional wisdom, which goes back to Boskin and Sheshinski (1983) (B&S) is that women should face lower marginal tax rates than their spouse because their labor supply is more elastic. Cremer et al. (2012) have shown that this result may be mitigated or even reversed for incentive reasons, in particular, when gender wage heterogeneity is smaller in highincome couples. In their setting there is a gender productivity gap but it re ‡ects "true" productivities and not discrimination. Our results, go exactly in the opposite direction in the sense that they tend to reinforce or reinstate the B&S result. Discrimination brings in the Pigouvian term which reduces the marginal tax rate applied to the female spouse.
Proposition 1 (i) When couples'types are observable and the female spouse in couple i su¤ ers from wage discrimination, that is i f < 1, her income will be subject to a Pigouvian subsidy to correct for the misallocation of her labor supply.
(ii) When couples' types are not observable a spouse's marginal income tax rate is de…ned by expression (12), which shows that it depends on a Pigouvian and on a Mirrleesian (incentive related) term. The Mirrleesian term can either be positive or negative, while the Pigouvian term is always negative for i f < 1. If the gender wage gap is large it may outweigh the traditional tax argument and imply a negative marginal tax rate for the female spouse.
(iii) Our results reinforce (or tend to reinstate) the B&S result that female spouses should have a smaller marginal tax rate than males.
The tradeo¤ between female and male labor supply
Combining expressions (1) and (3) shows that in the absence of taxation a couple chooses f and`m so that:
We can think about condition as a kind of "production e¢ ciency" condition within the household. It describes the e¢ cient tradeo¤ of a couple which has to earn a given gross income y m + y f in a "least costly", utility maximizing, way. When wages re ‡ect marginal products, condition (17) is also necessary for Pareto e¢ ciency. In our setting with the GWG Pareto e¢ ciency, however, requires:
In a full information world the Pareto e¢ cient tradeo¤ can then be decentralized by imposing a Pigouvian tax as de…ned by equation (10). To see this, observe that (1) and (3) imply that in the presence of taxation spouses' levels of labor supply are set according to:
Using (10) and the property w i j = i j n i j shows that the above equation coincides with (18) when T i y j = T P i y j 8j. We know from Cremer et al. (2012) that the optimal tax policy will in general distort the tradeo¤ between male and female labor supply. As these authors show this distortion arises for incentive reasons; it is a way to relax an otherwise binding incentive constraint. With no GWG, we have from (1) and (3)
With the GWG, combining (1), (3) and (12) we successively obtain:
Comparing equations (19) and (20) over and imply that it should, in general, be distorted. But the crucial point is that these are traditional incentive corrections which are not directly a¤ected by the GWG; the reference they are applied to is the spouses' relative productivities and not their wages. 6 To sum up, while the tax system distorts the spouses' relative labor supplies for incentive reasons it completely neutralizes the distortion introduced by the wedge between the female spouse's wage and her true productivity. 5 Recall that with no GWG
y j . 6 Once again this result applies to rules; actual levels may di¤er.
Proposition 2 The distortion of a couples' tradeo¤ between male and female labor supply is the same as in a Mirrleesian world without a GWG. It only depends on true productivities and not on wages.
Conclusion
We have studied the design of couples' income taxation when there is a GWG which re ‡ects the fact that female wages do not re ‡ect their true productivities. Marginal tax rates for males follow the same rule as in a Mirrleesian world. Those for women include a Mirrleesian and a Pigouvian term. The Mirrleesian expression is the same as when wages re ‡ect true productivities. The Pigouvian term, which is always negative, corrects for the wedge between wages and productivities. Consequently, the GWG tends to reduce the optimal marginal tax on women. Finally, a couples' tradeo¤ between male and female labor supply is the same as in a Mirrleesian world without a GWG. It only depends on true productivities and not on wages. While the tax system distorts the spouses' relative labor supplies for incentive reasons it completely neutralizes the distortion introduced by the wedge between the female spouse's wage and her true productivity.
The main lesson that emerges from our paper is that the GWG reduces the female spouse's marginal tax rate by a Pigouvian correction. This correction undoes the distortion in spouses' relative labor supply caused by the GWG. While this does not eliminate the GWG, it means that it is possible and desirable to restore a tradeo¤ between spouses'labor supplies that re ‡ects their true productivities.
To sum up, and to return to the question raised in the introduction, an appropriately designed general income tax can and should neutralize the distortions created by wage discrimination. In particular, "production e¢ ciency" for the spouses' relative labor supplies is reestablished.
Appendix
Derivation of M RS i xy j : Equations (7) and (8) 
Combining (A1) and (A3) and solving for M RS i xy j yields expression (9).
